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Plan Colombia: A Political, Economic,
and Cultural Analysis of Coca and
Poppy Eradication Projects ID
Putumayo, Colombia
Introduction
In 1999, the government of Andres
Pastrana (1998-2002) unveiled "Plan Colombia,
Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and the Strengthening
of the State" (Chepesiuk 2001). Today, it is no
wonder the above-mentioned plan is simply
referred to as Plan Colombia. Upon
examination, any competent analyst would
recognize alternative aims and objectives to
those stated in the official title of the plan. With
this idea in mind, this essay will explore the
existence of ulterior motives to the creation,
implementation and continued support of Plan
Colombia both within Colombia and at the
international level. Most specifically implicated
in this discussion will be the role of the
government of Colombia and that of the United
States and, furthermore, that of the elites of both
countries respectively. Considering the scope of
the issues surrounding Plan Colombia I have
decided to focus primarily on one particular
project initiated within its framework and
funding -- that of the illicit crop eradication
achieved through methods of aerial spraying.
As I will demonstrate in this paper, coca
and opium poppy eradication projects have had
adverse consequences on local communities.
Among those affected are indigenous groups
situated in the Southern regions of the country.
Health complications among cornmunity
members and their livestock, contamination of
basic food crops, and ecological destruction,
among other things, have been directly attributed
to aerial spraying. I will discuss these
consequences and moreover, suggest reasons for
the continued practice and support of this
method. In this instance, I will consider the
position of the current Colombian government on
Plan Colombia and, most specifically, its support
of aerial spraying. Despite the outcry of
indigenous peoples and their sympathizers in
both Colombia and the international community,
such methods of crop eradication are under no
threat of suspension. On the contrary, as I will
argue in this paper, aerial spraying and, more
precisely, its accompanying consequences are
directly linked to the hidden agenda of the
Colombian government and the Colombian elite.
The United States, as we shall see, is also
implicated in these dynamics.
Using a theoretical framework based on
my reading of William Roseberry, Fernando
Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Flaetto, I will
explore the nature of enthusiasm expressed by
some members of Colombian society towards
Plan Colombia and additionally, towards
continued relations between Colombia and the
United States. As I will argue in this paper, U.S.
interests in Colombia are served by and
moreover, internalized by a powerful fraction of
Colombian society. This group includes, but is
not limited to, the Colombian elite and the rising
middle classes. Theoretical speculations in this
respect, though admittedly lacking in specificity,
can serve the purpose of discussing ulterior aims
and objectives to Plan Colombia nonetheless. In
this sense, this discussion will serve as more of a
starting point for reflection and contemplation of
my research fmdings than as a defmitive
presentation of answers and conclusions.
A Brief History of Plan Colombia
As mentioned in the introduction, it was
the government of Andres Pastrana that unveiled
Plan Colombia in 1999. Essentially, Plan
Colombia is a multi-billion dollar project
designed by the Colombian and U.S.
governments to tackle the roots of the
international narcotics industry and, by
extension, the rising group of Colombian
insurgents reportedly supported by drug-related
income. As one expert explains "The aim [of
Plan Colombia] was to reduce the inflow of
drugs into the United States, the world's largest
market for narcotics, while strengthening
Colombia's armed forces in their fight against
leftist rebels" (Vieira 2003: 4). Among the
groups specifically targeted by Plan Colombia
T()TF,\j ,."j 1; }()fl·l·.'.\I1)~
c:()p ....·r~0~r ~<200S T(rfE\f: ill\.. I..:\X'()J,mrn:ll c::f .\nrh[()~"\n1.).:.;~·
Pineda: Plan Colombia
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2005
are guerrilla groups like the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARe).
At its onset, Plan Colombia was
designed as a two-year mainly military aid
package for Colombia and its Andean neighbours
(U.S. Department of State 2001). Pastrana
pledged $4 billion of this amount and called
upon the international community to provide the
remaining sum. Among those to respond to
Pastrana's requests was the United States.
According to the U.S. Department of State, $1.3
billion in interagency assistance to Colombia
would be provided in response to Plan Colombia.
This sum was to be added to previously approved
U.S. assistance totaling over $330 million.
Funds received through Plan Colombia
are used mainly for counter-narcotics purposes.
More specifically, these funds are used in the
procurement and support of sophisticated
helicopters, high-tech drug interdiction
equipment, weaponry and the training of military
personnel. As some have noted, approximately
80% of Plan Colombia's funding is directed
towards the various needs of military and police
forces. The costly programs of aerial fumigation
carried out by these state groups are among those
funded by Plan Colombia. Twenty million
dollars of U.S. approved assistance to Colombia,
for example, is allocated especially to the
purchase and support of Ayers S2R T-65 aerial
spray aircrafts (U.S. Department of State 2001).
To date, Colombia is the single largest recipient
of military aid in all of Latin America (Vieira
2003). This aid, however, is received at high
social costs.
Social Costs oCPlan Colombia
According to a statement produced by a
group of NGOs at the International Conference
for Peace and Human Rights in October of 2002,
for example, "International agencies are fully
convinced that Plan Colombia, as it is designed
will not contribute to Peace but rather, we fear,
will result in more deaths and despair for the
Colombian people" (Fletcher 2003). These
feelings echoed a similar position taken by
Amnesty International in June of the same year.
After careful review of Plan Colombia and its
effects on local populations, they produced a
statement completely opposing it. In their own
words "the organization has serious concerns
regarding the impact of Plan Colombia on human
rights and the armed conflict" (Amnesty
International 2000). Many local non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) share a
similar disdain for Plan Colombia and have
refused to accept Plan Colombia funding. Nataly
Fletcher reports in her article Advocates or
Obstacles? NGOs and Plan Colombia, for
example, "[i]n August of 2002, a coalition of 37
Colombian NGOs rejected the plan due to ethical
and political difficulties and urged the European
Union to search for alternatives to Plan
Colombia" (2003: 22). Despite national and
international outcry, however, Plan Colombia
received approximately $1.4 million dollars of
U.S aid per day between 1999 and 2002 (Vieira
2003: 1). Furthermore, Plan Colombia has
maintained its position of top priority on the
agenda of current government officials. Strong
support of Plan Colombia, its goals and its
objectives by Colombian president Alvaro Uribe
(2000-2004) is a case in point.
To more fully understand the nature of
national and international opposition to Plan
Colombia it is first necessary to describe one of
the major projects funded by this officially
proclaimed "war on drugs." In an attempt to
gain control over coca and opium poppy
producing regions of the country, the
government has taken initiative in spraying large
sections of the Colombian countryside with
highly poisonous herbicides. As one source
explains "[b ]etween December 22, 2000 and
February 2001, the Colombian government, with
new military hardware from Plan Colombia, and
the support of recently US trained anti-narcotics
battalions, ordered the armed forces to begin
aerial fumigation with a chemical known as
glyphosphate" (Rights and Democracy 200 I:
29). In total, an estimated 60, 000 hectares of
coca and poppy fields were targeted throughout
the country (ibid.). In what follows, I will briefly
discuss crop eradication projects in Putumayo,
examine the consequences of their use on local
peoples, flora and fauna, and fmally, discuss
their efficacy in eliminating coca and poppy
production in the region.
Coca and Poppy Eradication Projects
The department of Putumayo is located
in the southern region of Colombia along the
border with Ecuador. This area has been
described as being rich in minerals and other
natural resources (Kristensen 2003). Putumayo
is the epicenter of Plan Colombia and has been
the main target of government-initiated schemes
of coca field fumigation since the
implementation of Plan Colombia. In the year
2003, 200 000 hectares of coca fields were
fumigated within the region (Chepesiuk 2001).
This process involved the use of about 4.6
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million liters of herbicides containing high doses
of glyphosphate (Chepesiuk 2001). These
herbicides are known by their commercial name
as Roundup and are produced by the American
company of Monsanto (Kristensen 2003, Walcott
2003). The warning Monsanto places on its
product tell of its adverse effects on local
populations and ecology. I will quote the
Roundup label at length as it important to this
discussion:
Roundup will kill almost any green
plant that is actively growing .... Take
care to spray Roundup only on the
weeds you want to kill- don't allow the
spray to contact plants you like or they
may die too .... Roundup should not be
applied to bodies of water such as
ponds, lakes or streams as Roundup can
be harmful to certain aquatic
organisms .... After an area is sprayed
with Roundup, people and pets (such as
cats and dogs) should stay out of the
area until it is thoroughly dry.... We
recommend that grazing animals such
as horses, cattle, sheep, goats, rabbits,
tortoises and fowl remain out of the
treated area for two weeks ..." (Walcott
2003:31).
Interestingly, the specific formula of
Roundup used in Colombia, that of Roundup SL,
has not been approved for use within the United
States. Furthermore, as a source reports, "it
[Roundup SL] has been combined with
surfactants, or soapy additives, in order to
increase toxicity" (Kristensen 2003: 23).
In the Collins dictionary, glyphosphate
(the principle ingredient in Roundup SL) is
described as "a systemic nonselective herbicide
used in certain commercial weed killers"
(emphasis mine). Though government
fumigation programs are hypothetically intended
to target only illicit crops, the results are not
always so hopeful. The use of sophisticated
equipment like the agricultural spray aircrafts
purchased and supported by Plan Colombia
funds are insufficient to ensure that only coca
and opium poppy fields are eradicated.
Uncontrollable factors, such as natural wind
drift, handicap any attempts to contain aerial
spraying over specified fields. Drifts of these
herbicides onto fields of basic food crops like
yucca, plantain, and maize and onto livestock
like pigs and cattle are therefore not uncommon.
The fact that glyphosphates act indiscriminately
upon spraying further contributes to the dangers
of using it in regions of rich biological diversity.
As members in one Putumayo
municipality attest, there are clear connections
between the aerial crop fumigation and the
contamination of local food crops and livestock.
The delegates of a mission to Colombia between
May 27 and June 3, 2001, were shown
"elaborated lists of family losses, including the
number of hectares or animals, as well as the
exact date of the fumigation" by members of
several Putumayo communities they visited
(Rights and Democracy 2001:30). In another
Putumayo community, one indigenous leader
testified to the adverse effects of aerial crop
fumigation. In his own words:
Even our own products aren't doing
well. For example, the coffee and
cocoa crops were good 15 months ago,
but not anymore. They don't grow.
The papayas that we plant grow and
flower, but the leaves die. It is strange
what happens. These have to be the
effects of the spraying. It begins right
after they spray" (Walcott 2003:32
emphasis mine).
A general loss of livelihood and, in
some instances, situations of severe food crisis
are among the related consequences of food crop
and livestock contamination with glyphosphates
(Kosec 2003).
The most disturbing consequences of
Roundup use in Plan Colombia crop eradication
initiatives are those that the toxic herbicide has
on the health of local populations. In a recent
study carried out in rural parts of Colombia
"82.6% of the 403 people interviewed had
experienced some type of health problem or
illness within the four weeks after an aircraft
sprayed near their homes or workplaces"
(Kristensen 2003: 25). In this study, among the
most reported health problems associated with
Roundup were those of gastrointestinal or
digestive tract complications (82.6%), skin
irritations (58.3%), and eye problems ( 26.1 %)
(Kristensen 2003). Government officials,
however, refused to take responsibility for this.
One indigenous member of a Putumayo
community says that Colombian authorities "told
him that the idea that aerial herbicide spraying
affects human health was 'a lie'" (Kosec 2003:
46). At most, government officials will admit
that contact with Roundup will cause minor eye
irritation similar to the experience of having
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baby shampoo in the eyes (Rights and
Democracy 2001). Either way, Roundup
continues to be the product of choice for Plan
Colombia goals to eradicate illicit crops in the
Putumayo region.
Is Plan Colombia Successful?
Considering the amount of money and
effort that go into these projects it is reasonable
to inquire about their status in achieving stated
goals and objectives. Have projects of illicit
crop eradication been successful in decreasing
levels of coca and poppy production in
Colombia? Although I consulted many sources
for the purpose of this paper I was hard pressed
to fmd any positive comments about the
"success" of aerial spraying. As one of such
sources reports "After four years, Plan Colombia
has not led to a reduction in the land planted in
coca or opium poppies, despite u.s. aid to the
military and the police that has amounted to
nearly $1.4 million a day over that period"
(Vieira 2003:1). Some have even suggested that
levels of coca and poppy production have
actually increased in Colombia and its bordering
neighbours since eradication programs began
(Petras 2002)!
In light of unstable markets and demand
for legal food crops like coffee and yucca it is
understandable that many Colombian farmers
cling to coca and poppy production for their
livelihoods. In the specific case of the Putumayo
region, for example, "Since this state-abandoned
and impoverished area of Colombia offers little
in the way of viable economic alternatives,
people, in desperation, move further into the
Amazon jungle or to the Pacific Coast in order to
continue growing the only crop that allows them
to survive" (Rights and Democracy 200:30). In
this sense, as one field is eradicated, new ones
are quickly cultivated in more southern regions
as a response. The particularly well-suited
ecosystems of Southern Colombia and its
neighbours for coca and poppy growth further
contribute to the possibility of these dynamics.
As I recall from my Cultures of Latin America
course last year, for example, these areas tend to
promise a bountiful harvest of coca
approximately four times a year (Clark 2003).
With the local government providing few
alternatives to this stable income, local farmers
have little incentive to alternate their livelihood
strategies.
Furthermore, government promises to
support local farmers in their transition to
alternative crop production have proved
unfruitful. On December, 7 2001, for example, a
group of 62 international NGOs wrote a letter to
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell addressing
this concern stating "six months after the
agreements [pacts of recompensation for losses
and support in alternating livelihood], residents
had received no funds" (Fletcher 2003:23). In
this instance, local communities are hard pressed
to fmd reasons to abandon coca and poppy
production. In many cases, it is only in the
production of illegal crops that these
communities, like those of the Putumayo region,
can continue to survive.
Given this, it becomes obvious that Plan
Colombia is ineffective in targeting the
international narcotics industry at its very roots.
Not only does the plan exasperate miserable
conditions throughout the country, as seen in
Putumayo, but these conditions further
encourage coca and poppy production among
local farmers. Moreover, the government's
neglect of pressing social issues linked to Plan
Colombia like forced internal displacement,
economic crisis and food shortage have led many
Colombians to seek refuge among some of the
rebel groups targeted by military and police
forces. According to a Human Rights Watch
report on Colombian child soldiers, for example,
many children and youth joined guerilla groups
"simply ...out of hunger" (Semana 2003).
Despite the information presented above
both the United States and Colombian
governments continue to pour funds into Plan
Colombia. Today, Colombian president Alvaro
Uribe is as dedicated to Plan Colombia as
Pastrana was in years previous. In this instance,
coca and poppy eradication programs (no matter
how ineffective) are in little danger of being
suspended. According to one source "Aerial
spraying has the full support of Uribe, who has
made containment of Colombia's guerrilla forces
his top priority" (Walcott 2003:29). In that illicit
crops reportedly sustain insurgent groups,
Uribe's logic follows that eliminating the former
will subsequently weaken the latter. This logic,
as I have learned, is the basis for justifying
continued instances of aerial spraying.
However, like many of the justifications
for Plan Colombia and its projects, Uribe's logic
is flawed. The big bucks in the illegal drug
market are not being made by so-called "narco-
guerrillas." According to James Petras, such
groups are making relatively little profit from
coca and poppy cultivation as they only produce
and tax raw material (2002). As he notes in his
article The Geopolitics of Plan Colombia, "the
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big profits are in the processing and
commercialization in the export market and the
laundering of drug profits" (Petras 2002:47). In
this sense, a genuine attack on the narcotics
industry might be better fought elsewhere. For
some, this attack might be more tactfully directed
towards the largest consumer of illegal drugs like
cocaine and opium in the world: the United
States (Chomsky 2000, Walcott 2003, Podur
2003).
With this point in mind, if Plan
Colombia funding could be redirected towards
the "demand end of things", perhaps the
Colombian and U.S. governments would see
results more fitting to their aims of countering
the narcotics industry. As one study concluded:
"$34 million spent on treatment of drug addicts
reduces cocaine use by one percent. The same
result costs $360 million when coca production
interdiction methods are used" (Walcott 2003:
35). Given the potential of alternative measures
to the "war on drugs" and the evident failure of
Plan Colombia to achieve its stated goals and
objectives, it seems curious that Plan Colombia
would continue to receive so much support from
both the Colombian and U.S. governments. In
the midst of similar ponderings, Noam Chomsky
suggests an insightful interpretation in his book
Rogue States: The Rule of Force in World
Affairs. In this respect Chomsky writes: "It is
only reasonable to conclude that the 'war on
drugs,' cast in the harshly punitive forms
implemented in the past 20 years is achieving its
goals, not failing" (2000:81, emphasis in
original). In examining aerial spraying schemes,
Chomsky's observation becomes particularly
pertinent.
What is Plan Colombia Actually Achieving?
As I have demonstrated above, these
schemes are doing little to decrease the overall
production of coca and poppy production. They
have, however, been quite successful in
exasperating miserable (and in many instances
unlivable) conditions for the indigenous
communities throughout targeted regions like
Putumayo. Increased instances of health
complications among local populations and
ecological damage observed in these regions are
cases in point. In many of these instances,
displacement into other regions of the country is
the only viable alternative for local peoples. To
date, Colombia has the fourth largest population
of internally displaced individuals in the world
(U.S. Department of State 2001). Though there
are many causes contributing to forced internal
displacement like the armed conflict between
guerrilla and the paramilitary groups, Plan
Colombia conceivably contributes greatly to this
phenomenon.
In the article entitled The Ones Who
Preserve Our Identity: Women. Children and
Plan Colombia author Katrina Kosec speaks to
this connection between Plan Colombia and
forced displacement. As Kosec states
"Migration necessitated by food and work
shortages, personal danger, or orders from the
government or other actors has emptied entire
indigenous territories" (Kosec 2003: 47). In the
case of Putumayo, local indigenous leaders
reported that displacement out of the region
following overhead aerial spraying was, in many
instances, the only alternative for their
communities (Rights and Democracy 2001). In
this sense, it is clear that aerial spraying in
Putumayo, while contributing little to decreasing
coca and poppy production in the region is, in
fact, quite successful in accomplishing one thing:
clearing out vast regions of land for alternative
purposes. The fact that Putumayo is a region
characterized by its richness in minerals and
natural resources adds further clarity to our
understanding of Plan Colombia's goals.
Unlimited access to oil reserves in the
region, for example, would be a direct
consequence of securing control over Putumayo.
Oil, it must be remembered, is the primary
source of energy in the United States (Petras
2002). With this in mind, support of Plan
Colombia by wealthy oil companies like BP-
Amoco and Occidental Petroleum is quite
understandable (Kristensen 2000). According to
Kristensen, Putymayo has been handed over to
approximately 28 different multinational
companies in the past several years (2003)!
As I have learned, indigenous
communities are a major obstacle to oil-seeking
mongers like those mentioned above. Although
indigenous peoples make up only 2% of the
Colombian population, the 1991Constitution
grants them territorial autonomy over large
portions of land throughout the country (Podur
2003). To this extent human rights activist
Hector Mondragon writes: "their [indigenous
communities'] territory extends over 21 percent
of Colombia, and contains a high percentage of
the natural renewable and nonrenewable
exploitable resources. For example, over 50
percent of the petroleum is located on indigenous
territory" (Mondragon 2004). Territorial
autonomy in these regions would therefore
hinder direct control of Putumayo natural
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resources by non-indigenous peoples and
companies. Again, it becomes clearer that
emptying Putumayo would consequently rid the
area of potential obstacles to accessing unlimited
oil and other such natural resources.
Using the "war on drugs" as a guise,
Plan Colombia has ulterior motives in mind. As
Chomsky observes "it [the war on drugs]
regularly serves the interests of private wealth:
interests revealed by the pattern of winners and
losers, targets and non-targets, well-funded and
under-funded in accord with the main interests of
US foreign and domestic policy generally and
the private sector that has overriding influence in
policy" (2000:81). These motives, as the case of
Putumayo has shown, take little consideration of
Colombian indigenous communities. And,
despite the outcry of many Colombian NGOs
and international organizations, Plan Colombia is
in little danger of being put to a halt.
Any critical website, article, or book on
Plan Colombia has the winners and losers
sketched out quite clearly. For the most part, the
United States is recognized as having the most to
gain from Plan Colombia. As one such argument
goes "The strategic goal [of the United States in
Plan Colombia] is to reconsolidate power in
Northern South America, secure unrestricted
access to oil, and enforce the 'no alternatives to
globalization' ideology" (Petras 2002:34).
Increased U.S presence in Colombia via Plan
Colombia facilitates the attainment of the
abovementioned goals. Following the United
States, there is a section of Colombian elite who
benefit directly from Plan Colombia. These are
mainly the national companies involved in
natural resource exploitation. Again, their access
to resources such as oil is hindered by indigenous
presence in regions like Putumayo and their
constitutional rights to territorial autonomy. This
group of elite and, furthermore, members of the
upper middle class, fully support Plan Colombia
and the accompanying implications of increased
U.S intervention in domestic affairs (Petras
2002).
The United States, the Colombian Elite, and
the Middle Classes
The United States and this stratum of
Colombian elite are inextricably linked.
Drawing from the work of Cardoso and Faletto it
is clear that in the relations described above
"foreign interests have internal expression
through the action of groups and persons who
represent them or have advantages in their
presence" (1979:27). The pressure national elites
and the upper middle classes exert on national
policy, for example, often accommodate U.S
interests in Colombia. Conversely, U.S.
intervention in Colombia through Plan Colombia
projects and initiatives secures the interests
(mainly fmancial) of the elite stratum of the
country.
What remains unclear, however, is the
support Plan Colombia receives throughout the
Colombian middle classes. As I have discovered
in my research, this support is considerably
widespread. The popularity of current president
Alvaro Uribe and his political agenda among
voters is a case in point. Maintaining Plan
Colombia's "war on drugs" as a platform
priority, Uribe managed to secure 53.4% of the
Colombian vote in 1998. This percentage is
substantial when compared to the support
received by Uribe's competitors: Horacio Serpa
31.72% , Luis Garzon 6.18%, Noemi Sanin
5.82% and other candidates 3.24% (IFES
Election Guide 2004).
As revealed in an opinion poll featured
in London, Ontario's local Latin American
newspaper, 76% of Colombian voters are in
favour of Uribe's re-election in the upcoming
presidential campaign (Prensa Latina 2004). As
the article states, Uribe's popularity may very
well be "the highest that any Colombian
president has had in more than a decade" (2004).
Support for Uribe is strongly felt when taking
into consideration the Colombian Constitution.
Article 197 of the 1991 Constitution specifically
states that "[n]o citizen who has served a term of
presidency can be re-elected president of the
Republic" (1991:51). Many Colombians,
however, are willing to make the necessary
amendments to the constitution in order to have
Uribe as head of the nation.
The question remains as to why such
widespread approval of Uribe, Plan Colombia,
and most especially continued U.S. presence
within the country exist among the Colombian
middle class. When considering the history of
U.S. relations in other parts of Latin America this
enthusiasm becomes more puzzling. The well-
documented instances of U.S intervention in
Nicaragua and Guatemala are cases in point.
Nonetheless, I refuse to view the middle class as
a group of thoughtless individuals. This abstract
mass needs to be analyzed by considering the
very real, thinking and feeling actors that
compose it. This standpoint is essential in an
attempt to understand political and economic
f'(Yi"!·,,\,! \.,Il?- ~"I().t··:1HI5
t .(jpynght :\.; 2(11):> TCITi··:,\!: The L\,\-"C} h>urnal o!: .'\nthrlipoh,p}
Totem: The University of Western Ontario Journal of Anthropology, Vol. 13 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 10
http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/totem/vol13/iss1/10
process as social processes (Cardoso and Flaetto
1979).
The dynamics between Colombia and
the United States need to be understood, to
borrow Eric Wolfs analogy, off the billiard table
(Roseberry 1989). Initially, I understood Plan
Colombia to be a direct imposition of U.S.
hegemony in Colombia via political and
economic means. I never considered, however,
the infiltration of U.S. hegemony socially. More
specifically, I never suspected U.S. interest to
fmd expression amidst the Colombian middle
classes. Such allegiances to the United States
were more fathomable throughout the elite and
upper-middle class stratum of Colombian
society. As I mentioned above, U.S. intervention
in Colombia would directly benefit such groups
in their own economic and political ventures.
In their book, Dependency and
Development in Latin America, Cardoso and
Faletto explain that it is "traditional groups" (i.e.
large landlords) and the "new middle class" in
Latin America that are "often the main sustaining
force for foreign interests" (1979:27). Listed
members of this middle class include
"technicians, private and public employers,
people devoted to the social sector, professionals,
and so forth" (Cardoso and Faletto 1979: 27). It
is these members of society that, according to
Cardoso and Faletto, have progressively gained
more strength in Latin America (1979). In
Colombia, for example, it is this mass of people
that has the potential to democratically direct
domestic policy and politics. Uribe's election by
the majority of Colombian voters reflects this
point. U.S. interests in Colombia are thus
"democratically" expressed through the support
of Uribe's voters.
In making this point must
acknowledge the incidences of terror, violence
and intimidation that reportedly surrounded
Uribe's campaign. In fact, these incidences are
wide-spread throughout most Colombian
elections. On October 25, 2003, for example,
municipal and departmental elections witnessed
the death of 13 voters and 30 candidates (Podur
2003). An additional 180 candidates withdrew
from the running out of fear for their lives (Podur
2003). I am therefore not naively painting a
picture of Colombian society as "democratic."
However, I do think I can say with confidence
that Uribe is well-supported among a large and
powerful stratum of Colombian society. Mainly,
as I stated above, the Colombian middle class.
What then am I to make of this apparent
widespread support for Uribe and, in extension,
continued relations with the United States? This
is, as I have discovered, a very complicated
matter. William Roseberry's work entitled
Americanization in the Americas, however,
helped me move towards a better understanding
of the issues outlined above. More specifically,
Roseberry alerted me to the political, economic
and, most importantly, cultural forces that are at
play in the dynamic relations between Colombia
and the United States. Unbeknownst to myself, I
had initially conceptualized these relations in
terms of autonomous "external" and "internal"
factors (Roseberry 1989). According to this
understanding, foreign interests expressed by
internal actors were best comprehended in terms
of the political and the economic pressures
exerted by the former (external) onto the latter
(internal).
I never took into account, however, the
consideration of cultural forces aiding in the
establishment of U.S. hegemony in Colombia.
To be more precise though, I never expected
these cultural forces to come from within
Colombian society itself. Roseberry's
explanation of the "internalization of the
external" phenomena clarified my understanding
of the nature of widespread support of Uribe in
Colombia (1989). It is through this support, as I
have demonstrated above, that those U.S.
interests fmd a viable means of expression in
domestic policy and current political agendas. It
is through the internalization of external foreign
interests by the Colombian middle class that
have welcomed the United States into Colombia
through the front door.
Understanding the nature of this
internalization is another complicated matter. I
carmot, for example, understand the allegiance
middle class individuals might have towards the
United States. In the case of Putumayo, why
would middle class individuals choose to align
themselves with exploitive multi-national
companies? This position, as I showed earlier,
directly encourages among other things
continued environmental degradation of the
region. This degradation affects all of Colombia
and not just the particular indigenous groups and
ecology of the area in question.
Concluding Remarks
Perhaps this summer, when I am in
Colombia I will be able to better understand
these issues. I will be able to discuss what I have
learned in this paper with many Colombians and
perhaps, gain a different perspective than the one
presented here. From afar, Plan Colombia seems
"II JTF\[ ·..,,1 I; 21)fH _>'tJ!)_~
C()r':1~~"hr\.~.?t105T()Ti.:\L oil-a.l·\V() ,1·)Urn;)! nf .\n!hr()~'(J')g~.
Pineda: Plan Colombia
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2005
like just another scheme permlttmg increased
U.S. intervention in Latin America. It also seems
like a plan benefiting mainly American interests.
The helicopters and herbicides used in coca and
poppy crop eradication programs, for example,
are all made in American. Profits from these
products are at stake if Plan Colombia falls under
question.
The elites and upper classes of
Colombia are also implicated in profiting from
Plan Colombia at the expense of other
Colombians. As I mentioned above, this group
often has direct connections and investments in
the oil companies situated in Putumayo. And
though these elites are often challenged by
guerilla groups like the FARC, I think that a long
history of class stratification in the country has
provided them with a space in which to exercise
power, privilege and dominance over others.
And the middle class, as it progressively gains
more strength in the country, is competing for
access to this formerly restricted space of upward
movement and opportunity. It is perhaps within
this competition that Plan Colombia is
internalized and interpreted as being in some
way beneficial to this group. The middle class
is, after all, one of the main supporting groups of
Plan Colombia.
It is in considering the divergent
interests of these two groups and the interests of
uprising indigenous movements in the country
that have made me suspect that social change in
Colombia is looming. None of these groups are
homogeneous. There are contradictions and
tensions within the groups as much as there is
between them. If, according to Cardoso and
Faletto, "social change depends on historical
alternatives" (1979:14) then it is perhaps in the
expression of difference between and within
groups that social change resides. Let us hope,
however, that this change takes into
consideration the heterogeneity that characterizes
the Colombia nation.
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